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Abstract 
The literature on market quality has focused on different perspectives but has overlooked its relationship with 
governance structure. This study analyzes the impact of a significant change in governance structure; that is 
demutualization, on market quality. We investigated one hundred thirty-seven non-financial firms listed on 
Demutualized Pakistan Stock Exchange and found that transaction cost has reduced by demutualization. We used 
two different proxies for transaction costs such as Thompson and Waller (1986) and Roll (1984) spread. We found 
that demutualization has a negative and significant impact on both proxies of the transaction cost. We conclude 
that demutualization has reduced the transaction cost and has improved market quality.  
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1. Introduction 
Stock exchange demutualization, which is a major change in the governance structure, started in 1993 when the 
first exchange was demutualized. Since its inception, many of the stock exchanges have demutualized and had 
changed its governance structure from mutual to demutualize. Demutualization is the process of transforming a 
mutual organization owned by the member to a corporation owned by investors (Elliot, 2002). The traditional 
mutual exchanges operated as non-profit entities while the demutualized exchanges operate as for-profit 
corporations. Demutualization has resulted in the separation of ownership. Investors do not need to participate in 
the daily activities of the exchange. They have to provide the capital and enjoy the profit and voting rights. 
Investors try to invest in companies that are flexible enough to respond to the business environment changes and 
can produce a profit. The objective of both management and shareholder is to maximize the profit. Therefore, the 
company decisions should be in favour of both the management and investors (Hughes and Zargar, 2006). 
Global competition has changed the governance structure of stock exchanges and has improved the 
performance and efficiency (Khan and Vieito, 2012; Slimane, 2012). This change has resulted in an increase in 
competition among exchanges for cross-listing and cross-trading in order to get benefit from both short-term and 
long-term efficiency (Werner and Kleidon, 1996; Kokkoris and Olivares-Caminal, 2008). Despite the development 
of the economy as a whole, demutualization also helps to develop the financial markets (Dorodnykh, 2014). 
Demutualization has increased the market share, trading volume and has reduced the bid-ask spread (Slimane, 
2012). In the short run, demutualized stock exchanges may lose efficiency, but in the long run, they operate 
efficiently (Srinivasan, 2011). Demutualization has caused an increase in the profitability and efficiency of the 
exchanges (Padilla-Angulo & Ben Slimane, 2018; Slimane & Angulo, 2018).  
The literature on demutualization has focused on the efficiency issues, welfare issues, or the profitability of 
the exchanges. There is a need to find the impact of demutualization on market performance in terms of quality 
and transaction cost. Prior literature is also confined to developed countries such as the USA and stock exchanges 
of Europe (Arnold et al., 1999; Khan and Vieito, 2012; Nielsson, 2009). There is a lack of studies in the emerging 
economies like Pakistan. This study is carried out to find whether demutualization of Pakistan Stock Exchange 
(PSX) has improved the quality of stock exchange, which is measured through transaction cost.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Changing in the ownership structure means that the organization is changing its strategy to cope with certain 
environmental changes. Stock exchanges change their ownership structure to cope with certain environmental 
changes such as globalization, global competition, and advancement in technology. Stock exchanges have been 
demutualized because the mutual structure failed to offer flexibility and finance needed to react to the current 
competitive environment (Serifsoy, 2008). For-profit investors run for-profit exchanges expecting to give better 
financing, help in making flexible decisions mechanism, and to expand new businesses (Aggarwal, 2002). 
Advancement in telecommunication technologies and the growth of the internet and wireless networks are 
radically altering the structure and nature of financial services. Advancement of the internet and other such 
technologies have developed new and different means for organizations to provide their financial services 
(Claessens, Glaessner, & Klingebiel, 2002).  New technologies have been entered in the trading system, and now 
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it is not confined to a certain geographical area or a physical location. Due to the development of Alternative 
Trading Systems (ATS) and Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) exchanges are now not confined to 
provide the services of trade execution, signalling and other activities (Akhtar, 2002). ATS and ECNs are supported 
by high hardware capacity, software packages and other internet facilities. These have brought efficiency and 
effectiveness in the matching of buy/sell orders at low transaction cost. According to Galper (2001), advancement 
in technology has changed the landscape, enabled exchanges to overcome geographical boundaries, and has 
reduced the intermediary role of exchange members. This means investors are now not bound in their trading 
activities to such limitations like trading time and geographical location.  
Stock exchanges are also facing a change in the competitive environment for the last two decades (Otchere 
& Abou-Zied, (2008). Technological change has raised new competitors like ECNs, which compelled exchanges 
to change their structure. With changes in the competitive environment, the traditional mutual structure of stock 
exchanges becomes less attractive. The relationship between customer and exchange has changed to seek better 
services and liquidity. Interests of the members become deviating, and the benefits of the mutual structure were 
reduced. Another issue with the mutual structure is that of its ability to raise capital. The cost of organizing a 
cooperative is greater than its benefits (Mendiola & O’Hara, 2003). It was tough for the old-style mutual exchanges 
to react to such competition. Due to these problems, some members of stock exchanges analyzed the need to 
introduce an electronic auction system. They analyzed that change in the corporate governance structure is 
essential. Therefore, they exerted pressure on members of stock exchanges and enforced them to accept the 
demutualization. 
Demutualized exchanges are expected to act more rapidly to the environmental changes (Angel, 2003). 
Demutualized exchange gives greater independence because it facilitates trading and ownership privilege of its 
members. The management of a demutualized exchange takes actions which are in the best interest of its members 
and shareholders. Now the interest of both the shareholders and stock exchange are the same because both are 
willing to maximize profit. Demutualized exchanges will be more transparent because these are accountable to 
shareholders not only in bottom-line decisions but also in new issues related to corporate governance (Jordan & 
Hughes, 2007).     
Prior literature has focused on the liquidity, efficiency and profitability of the stock exchange. Nielsson (2009) 
analyzed the case of Euronext and reported that the merger had improved the liquidity. Hart and Moore (1996) 
stated that the efficiency of stock exchanges has enhanced after demutualization. Schmiedel (2001) and Schmiedel 
(2002) also reported a positive influence of demutualization on efficiency. Demutualization has also resulted in an 
increase in the financial performance of stock exchanges (Cybo-Ottone, Di Noia, & Murgia, 2000; Aggarwal, 
2002: Aggarwal & Dahiya, 2006; Azzam, 2010). Krishnamurti, Sequeira, and Fangjian (2003) compared the 
market quality of National and Bombay stock exchanges and found that the market quality is improved by 
demutualization. Padilla-Angulo and Ben Slimane (2018) reported that financial performance is improved with 
the demutualization. They also stated that this relationship is moderated by corporate governance. Slimane and 
Angulo (2018) argued that the long term performance of exchange has improved after demutualization while they 
found no evidence of improvement in the short term performance.  
This study contributes to the literature by finding the impact of demutualization on transaction cost in an 
emerging market context.  
 
2.1 Market Quality 
There is no single measure in the literature that quantifies the market quality. Researchers compare the market 
quality based on several measures such as volatility, informational efficiency, and liquidity. Market quality can 
also be measured through transaction cost (Krishnamurti, Sequeira, & Fangjian, 2003). Transaction cost can be 
implicit, also known as execution cost, or implicit. Execution cost (implicit) can be calculated by subtracting the 
transaction price from the benchmark price. The execution cost is difficult to measure because it cannot be directly 
observed. Therefore, researchers have defined the execution cost in different ways and have given their own 
measures for it (e.g., Hasbrouck, 1993; Roll, 1984; Thompson &Waller, 1986; Chan & Lakonishok, 1993). Various 
measures are available to measure transaction cost. The most dominant measures of transaction cost are the 
effective bid-ask and quoted bid-ask spread. Transactions are executed on the quoted bid and ask prices when there 
is a pure dealership in the market. To measure transaction cost based on the quoted bid-ask spread, appropriate 
measures should be taken (Barclay et al., 1999; Huang & Stoll, 1996). However, in some markets, there is high 
frequency trading. In such markets, trading occurs between the spread. This will overstate the investors’ trading 
cost. This will result in the formation of effective spread. Effective spread is the difference between the selling and 
buying prices by dealer at the current and previous time, respectively. It is an appropriate measure of transaction 
cost (Roll, 1984). 
This study uses two different measure of transaction cost, that is, Thompson and Waller (1986) and Roll 
(1984) spread.  
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2.2 Hypothesis Development 
Transaction cost is crucial because it affects the liquidity of the market. If the transaction cost is higher, it will be 
difficult for investors to buy and sell securities quickly. Transaction cost leads to higher market volatility (Hau, 
2006). Amihud and Mendelson (1986) argued that when the bid-ask spread is higher, then investors will demand 
higher returns to compensate for the risk and higher trading cost.  
Demutualization has resulted in increased liquidity (Neilson, 2009) due to which the number of market 
participants has increased. This increase in the number of the market participant may lead to a reduction in the 
transaction cost (Krishnamurti, Sequeira, & Fangjian, 2003). Therefore, we hypothesize that demutualization has 
reduced the transaction cost and has improved the market quality. 
 
3. Data 
This study used unbalanced panel data that is composed of 137 non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock 
exchange for the period of 2005 to 2017. Data is obtained from different sources.  To calculate the transaction cost, 
which is our dependent variable, we used daily prices. Data of stock prices are obtained from the website khistock 
(www.khistocks.com), which provides data related to the Pakistani financial market. The dependent variable of 
the study is the demutualization of PSX. As PSX is demutualized in 2012, we use a dummy variable which takes 
1 value after demutualization and 0 otherwise. We exclude 2012 from our sample, which is the year of 
demutualization. 
We also controlled for various firm-specific and macroeconomic variables that literature suggests can affect 
transaction cost. We controlled for profitability, size, leverage, and return volatility. Data of these variables are 
obtained from the financial statements of the firms. We also controlled for GDP and global financial crises. Data 
of GDP is obtained from the database of the World Bank while a dummy variable is used for the financial crises. 
All variables are defined and explained in table 1. 
 
3.1 Measuring Transaction Cost 
In this study, we used two different proxies for transaction cost, which are Thompson and Waller (1986) and Roll 
(1984) spread. Both of these models are based on the actual price changes. They are explained in the next section. 
Table 1. Definition of Variables 
Notation Name of variable Explanation 









TW Spread Thompson and Waller 
Spread 
It is the bid-ask spread calculated through Thompson 
and Waller (1986) model. 
Roll Spread Roll Spread It is the bid-ask spread calculated through the Roll 
(1984) model. 





Demut Demutualization It is change in the governance structure of stock 
exchange. It is a dummy variable that takes 0 before 
demutualization year and 1 otherwise. The year of 
demutualization is 2012 in our case. 
Panel 3: Control 
Variables 
  
ROA Return of Assets Net income divided by total assets 
Size Firm Size Market capitalization is used as size of the firm. It is 
calculated as total number of shares times price per 
share. 
Leverage Leverage It is calculated as total liabilities over total assets. 
Return_Volatility Volatility of Returns Calculated by taking standard deviation of the stock 
returns. 
GDP Gross Domestic Product Natural log on the GDP. 
Financial_Crisis Dummy variable for 
Global financial crisis of 
2008 
Dummy variable that takes 0 before crisis and 1 
otherwise 
Note: This table provides an explanation of all the variables used in the study. Panel 1 explains the dependent 
variables of the study. Panel 2 explain the independent variable, while panel 3 explains the control variables of 
the study.  
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3.2 Thompson and Waller (1986) Spread 
Thompson and Waller spread is based on the absolute price changes. They were the pioneers to give the idea of 
calculating the bid-ask spreads through absolute price changes. The price change can be expressed as 
∆ =

2  + ∆	 
Where ∆ is the price change at time t. S denotes the spread.  is an indicator variable. It takes value of -2 if sell 
follows a buy order, and takes 2 if a buy follows a sell order, and takes 0 otherwise. The formula for estimating 
the Thompson and Waller spread is, 






Where P is the stock prices, and ∆ is the price changes. We take absolute of the price changes to find the absolute 
price changes.  
 
3.3 Roll (1984) Spread 
Roll (1984) give a model to measure transaction cost. He assumes that the market is efficient and that the actual 
prices follow a random walk. Roll spread can be calculated as, 
  = 2−(∆ , ∆!) 
Where (∆ , ∆!) is the auto covariance of price changes and its lag value. 
 
4. Methodology 
To find the impact of demutualization on transaction cost, we estimated two different models. These models used 
different proxies for transaction cost. The first model uses Thompson and Waller (1986) spread as a proxy for 
transaction cost. To test whether transaction cost is reduced by demutualization, we estimated the following model, 

 # = $ + %&	'( + %)*+#+%,-.# + %/01# + %2('3_(--(5# + %67&
+ %89-33:-_-;; + 3';(5# + < + =# 
Where TW spread is Thompson and Waller spread. Demut is demutualization, ROA is the return on assets, 
size is the firm size, leverage is the leverage ratio of the firm, Return_volatility is the volatility of stock returns, 
GDP is the gross domestic product, Financial_Crises is the global financial crises of 2008, Industry is the dummy 
variable for each industry, and Year is the dummy variable for each year. ε is the error term while i stands for the 
ith firm and t stands for time. Hausman (1978) specification test is used to choose between fixed and random effect 
model.  
The second proxy for transaction cost used in this study is the Roll (1984) spread. To test whether Roll spread 
is reduced after demutualization, we estimated the following model, 
 # = $ + %&	'( + %)*+#+%,-.# + %/01# + %2('3_(--(5# + %67&
+ %89-33:-_-;; + 3';(5# + < + =# 
Where Roll Spread is Roll (1984) spread. Demut is demutualization, ROA is the return on assets, size is the 
firm size, leverage is the leverage ratio of the firm, Return_volatility is the volatility of stock returns, GDP is the 
gross domestic product, Financial_Crises is the global financial crises of 2008, Industry is the dummy variable for 
each industry, and Year is the dummy variable for each year. ε is the error term while i stands for the ith firm and 
t stands for time. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Before estimating our models, we give descriptive statistics of the dependent and other variables used in the study. 
We do not include two variables that are demutualization and financial crises because they are dummy variables. 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the data. Table 2 shows that the mean value of TW Spread is 10.262 
and has a standard deviation (SD) of .976. This means that the variation in the Thompson Spread is very small. 
Table 2 also shows that there is not a very large difference in the minimum and maximum values of the Thompson 
spread. Comparatively, Roll spread has a higher variation as it has an SD of 249.059. Table 2 also shows that the 
min value of Roll spread is 0, while the maximum value is 2852.317, which means that there is a large difference 
in the values. The ROA shows moderate variation as its SD is 13.103 and also has a moderate difference in the 
minimum and maximum values. Size has a mean value of 22.907 and SD of 1.506, which means that there is low 
variation in the data. The minimum and maximum value of size also show a small difference. Leverage also shows 
a small variation as the SD is 0.299. The minimum value of leverage is 0.006, and the maximum value is 3.318, 
which also show a small difference between the lowest and highest values. Return volatility has the mean value 
3.377 and SD 1.758, which suggest that the variation is low in the data. Finally, GDP has a mean value of 16.569 
and SD of 0.497, which also suggest a low variation is the data. Table 2 shows that there are no extreme values 
for all variables in the data. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 TW Spread 1616 10.262 .976 5.368 13.926 
 Roll Spread 1188 141.716 249.059 0 2852.317 
 ROA 1338 6.981 13.103 -163.28 67.96 
 Size 1338 22.907 1.506 18.174 27.165 
 Leverage 1336 .52 .299 .006 3.318 
 Return_Volatility 1761 3.377 1.758 .849 7.599 
 GDP 1761 16.569 .487 15.72 17.217 
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics of the data. Two proxies of depended variables are included in 
the table, that is TW Spread and Roll Spread. Demutualization and financial crises are dummy variables and 
are excluded from the table. All other variables are controlled variables. Obs is the number of observations; 
Mean is the mean value, Std.Dev is the standard deviation, Min is the minimum value, and Max is the maximum 
value. The sample period is from 2005 to 2017. 
 
5.2 Regression Results 
Before estimating the models to find the impact of demutualization on transaction cost, we find whether the FE or 
RE model is appropriate. We make the model selection decision based on the Hausman (1978) test. If this test is 
significant, then we choose FE model, otherwise, we choose RE model. Table 3 reports the results of the Hausman 
test, which suggest that FE models is more appropriate.  
Table 3. Hausman Test 
     Coef. 
 Chi-square test value 22.887 
 P-value .002 
Note: This table reports Hausman test results. The table provides the Chi-square statistics and its p-value.  
 
Table 4 : Regression results  
      (1)   (2) 
       TW_Spread    Roll_Spread 
 Demut -1.480*** -609.022* 
   (0.228) (315.094) 
 ROA -0.000 1.428** 
   (0.000) (0.644) 
 Size 0.010 63.620*** 
   (0.014) (18.277) 
 Leverage 0.035 -45.166 
   (0.031) (36.441) 
 Return_Volatility -0.894*** 6.406 
   (0.089) (26.408) 
 GDP -3.008*** -676.602** 
   (0.316) (331.593) 
 Financial_Crisis 0.894*** 73.959 
   (0.197) (101.121) 
 _cons 63.121*** -12260.438** 
   (5.448) (5432.269) 
 Obs. 1122 786 
 R-squared  0.829 0.238 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes  Yes 
Note: This table reports the results of the regression analysis. Column 1 reports the results of the equation with 
Thompson and Waller spread as the dependent variable. Column 2 reports the results of the equation with Roll 
spread as the dependent variable. Definitions of all variables are given in Table 1. Standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and  * shows the significance at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance, 
respectively. 
Table 4 reports the results of the two estimated models. Two regressions are run to find the impact of 
demutualization on transaction cost. The R2 for model 1 and model 2 are 0.829 and 0.238, respectively. Results 
show that the coefficient of demutualization is negative and significant for both models controlling for firm-
specific variables, macroeconomic variables, industry effect, and year effect. These results suggest that transaction 
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cost has significantly reduced after demutualization. The reason for this decrease in transaction cost and improved 
market quality is the change in the governance structure of the stock exchange. Domowitz and Steil (1999) argued 
that due to better governance, demutualized exchanges perform better in terms of investor protection, regulation, 
transparency, internal control system, and use of technology. More and more investors are attracted due to this 
improved governance and better protection. Moreover, demutualized exchanges provide easy access to remote 
investors for trading which boost up the trading activity and result in the reduction of the transaction cost. These 
results are consistent with Krishnamurti, Sequeira, and Fangjian (2003). 
Table 4 report that size has no significant effect on transaction cost in model 1, while it shows a positive and 
significant impact of size on transaction cost in model 2. These results suggest that transaction cost increases with 
an increase in the firm size. The coefficient of leverage is insignificant in case of both models. This suggests that 
leverage has no influence on transaction cost in our case. Stock return volatility has a negative and significant 
impact on transaction cost in case of model 1. This means that transaction cost decrease with increase in stock 
return volatility. Table 4 also shows that the coefficient of GDP is negative and significant for both models. An 
increase in GDP causes a decrease in the transaction cost. Finally, the coefficient of financial crises is positive and 
significant in model 1 but is insignificant in model 2.  
Summing up, we explore whether transaction cost has reduced after demutualization and found that it has 
significantly reduced. Results are significant for both of the models. Demutualized stock exchange performs better 
than mutual. Due to improved governance and efficiency, it attracts more investors and has increased the trading 
activity. This has reduced that bid-ask spread which results in low transaction cost and higher market quality. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Stock exchange provides the trading services to investors. Previous literature has focused to analyze the market 
quality from different perspectives. The relationship between demutualization and transaction cost is overlooked 
by researchers. Domowitz and Steil (1999) argued that the member of mutual exchanges oppose the change in 
governance structure because it will eliminate their intermediation role. However, the shareholders of the 
demutualized stock exchange support this change because this enhances the value of the firm. Taking Pakistan 
Stock Exchange as a case, which has demutualized in 2012, we found that transaction cost has reduced after 
demutualization and hence market quality is improved. These results are consistent with prior literature.  
This study has implications for the emerging market where the regulators have no control on the monopolists. 
Demutualization enhances the competition, which will reduce the influence of the monopolists. Demutualized 
stock exchanges also use the latest technology which helps to eliminate the need to go to the trading floor. This 
enhances the trading activity and hence reduces the transaction cost. In short, demutualization causes an 
improvement in the market quality in emerging markets. 
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